W.E.B. Du Bois v. Booker T. Washington

In chapter three of The Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois critiques Booker T. Washington’s belief that, in order to survive, black people must be submissive and silent. Du Bois notes the position of Booker T. Washington when he states, “…it has been claimed that the Negro can survive only through submission. Mr. Washington distinctly asks that black people give up, at least for the present, three things,–first, political power, second, insistence on civil rights, third, higher education of Negro youth” (Du Bois 30). Political power, civil rights, and higher education are, arguably, some of the most important factors in not only surviving, but also in the eventual attainment of equality. On the most basic level, Washington’s belief that black people should take a submissive stance when it comes to their integration into society would, as Du Bois notes, lead to “[t]he disfranchisement of the Negro…[and] a distinct status of civil inferiority” (Du Bois 31).

While Du Bois continually critiques Washington’s ideas, plans, and actions, he makes a pointed statement regarding the importance of rights for the black population. After discussing how degradation is a result, rather than a cause of lower social levels of black people, Du Bois argues:

They do not expect that the free right to vote, to enjoy civic rights, and to be educated, will come in a moment; they do not expect to see the bias and prejudices of years disappear at the blast of a trumpet; but they are absolutely certain that the way for a people to gain their reasonable rights is not by voluntarily throwing them away and insisting that they do not want them; that the way for a people to gain respect is not by continually belittling and ridiculing themselves; that, on the contrary, Negroes must insist continually, in season and out of season, that voting is necessary to modern manhood, that color discrimination is barbarism, and that black boys need education as well as white boys. (Du Bois 33)

In sum, Du Bois believes one cannot obtain rights by removing the rights that they already have and claiming they do not want their rights. Rather, black people must continually press society for their rights, such as the vote and equal education.

My question concerns the relationship between Du Bois’ historical account and critique of the problems with Washington’s stance on how black people should gain rights in society and his overall theoretical/philosophical framework that governs his text. Du Bois’ text is governed by the ideas of double-consciousness, the veil, and two-ness. Does Du Bois’ critique of Washington’s desire for submission and assimilation relate to the ideas of double-consciousness and the veil in that submission would require one to not merge their two-ness, but rather deny their blackness in order to become an American? If one were to follow the advice of Washington, would that be, according to Du Bois, an illegal short cut which only places a band-aid on the problem of two-ness for the black person, rather than solving the real issues at hand? If one’s life is shaped by the “white gaze”, would this submission and assimilation result in any form of equality, or would it rather solidify how white people view black people, as, without rights, there seems to be no way in which black people can define themselves independently of the white society in which they submitted and assimilated into?  Would submission and assimilation remove the possibility for black people to become, simultaneously, “both a Negro and an American” (Du Bois 3)?

References:

Du Bois, W.E.B.. The Souls of Black Folk. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1994. Print.

The Veil, Double-Consciousness, and Two-nes

Each time I read any section of The Souls of Black Folk, I am amazed at Du Bois’ ability to so eloquently articulate his ideas about race. Only published seven years after Hoffman’s “Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro,” Du Bois’ ability to construct an analysis of race in America as a social, rather than scientific, construction seems revolutionary and far beyond the comprehension of white scholars at the time of his book’s publication.

One of the most striking passages in the first few chapters of Du Bois’ text was his description of the double-consciousness of black people in America. After discussing his childhood realization that black and white children have starkly different opportunities, Du Bois notes:

After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world,–a world which yields him no true self-revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,–an American, a Negro; two souls, two throughs, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. (Du Bois 2)

This passage from Du Bois’ text is important because it brings up, among other things, three key themes or terms, namely the: veil, double-consciousness, and two-ness of black people in America. Hence, my question is, what does Du Bois mean by these terms? Is there any difference between the veil, double-consciousness, and two-ness of black people in America? 

When Du Bois mentions the veil, one may think to a wedding. In a wedding, a veil is sometimes worn by the bride, not only restricting an observers view of her face, but also restricting her view of her own face. However, while all of the observers can view the bride in an uninhibited fashion, the bride must look out, from the physical confinement of her veil, through a haze. While this description of the ways in which the veil may inhibit a bride’s sense of view may be overstated, it is nonetheless important to think about the ways in which a veil not only marks someone as different from the crowd, but also creates an isolated space from which one must view the world through a seemingly hazy lens. With a veil, one is seeing a distorted world. Furthermore, one must wonder what others see when they see you, as, under the veil, one often cannot see them self clearly. In the context of race, it seems that the veil constricts the view of black people, meaning that they cannot truly view themselves aside from the ways in which white people view them. In addition, the veil’s symbolization of purity in marriage may even suggest that the veiling of black people in America is an attempt to maintain racial purity through a barrier of separation, even if this barrier is not physically there. One must ask then, who veils the black people of America? It seems that the answer would be white people, and thus the veil seems to further suggest that it is an attempt to erase the ability of black people to see themselves independently from the image that white people assign to them.

Double-consciousness and the veil, for Du Bois, seem to be two interrelated terms. In the passage above, double-consciousness seems to mean that black people have the ability to view themselves from their own standpoint, as well as that of white people. Not only can they see themselves independent of the white gaze, but they also understand the ways in which white people view them, understand them, and demoralize them. On a deeper level, Du Bois seems to suggest that black people can see the ways in which the white racist system operates, and the mechanisms used to keep them as the bottom race in the racial hierarchy. Furthermore, one must wonder, to what extent does the double-consciousness mean that black people have two separate identities? Does this mean they separate, in their minds, the ways in which they view themselves and the ways white people view them or have told them to view themselves? Would this negate the idea of the veil in that the veil impacts the ways in which people can view themselves? Or is the veil and the idea of double-consciousness interacting in a more complex way? 

Interestingly enough, the compartmentalization of this double-consciousness could have both positive and negative effects. If Du Bois means, by double-counsciousness, that black people are aware of the ways that white people view them, there is potential for the internalization of the white characterization of black people. As Du Bois notes, this white classification of black people and loss hope for freedom has resulted, in some cases, of black people feeling “ashamed of themselves” (Du Bois 3). Hence, the compartmentalization of this double-consciousness may allow for one to not internalize the pervasive ideas of inferiority spouted from the white side of history. However, as Du Bois suggests, this double-consciousness, or two-ness means that black people are facing the reality of “two warring ideals in one dark body” (Du Bois 2), something that clearly impacts the ways in which one views them self. What are the implications for this sustained two-ness? When Du Bois notes, “an American, a Negro” (Du Bois 2), is he suggesting that to be an American means one cannot be a “Negro,” and vice versa? What would happen if, for example, white people gained the ability of a sense of double-consciousness? Would the realization of how black people view white people and the ways in which white people have historically viewed black people produce a complete awareness of the plight of black people in America? 

Questions Combined:

What does Du Bois mean by the veil, double-consciousness, and two-ness? Is there any difference between the veil, double-consciousness, and two-ness of black people in America? Who veils the black people of America? To what extent does the double-consciousness mean that black people have two separate identities? Does this mean they separate, in their minds, the ways in which they view themselves and the ways white people view them or have told them to view themselves? Would this negate the idea of the veil in that the veil impacts the ways in which people can view themselves? Or is the veil and the idea of double-consciousness interacting in a more complex way? What are the implications for this sustained two-ness? When Du Bois notes, “an American, a Negro” (Du Bois 2), is he suggesting that to be an American means one cannot be a “Negro,” and vice versa? What would happen if, for example, white people gained the ability of a sense of double-consciousness? Would the realization of how black people view white people and the ways in which white people have historically viewed black people produce a complete awareness of the plight of black people in America? 

Sources Used:

Du Bois, W.E.B.. The Souls of Black Folk. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1994. Print.

Life Conditions vs. Race Traits: Hoffman and Jefferson

A theme present in both the works of Hoffman and Jefferson is the idea of race traits and life conditions. In their most simple forms, race traits seem to be characteristics about a person, or group of people, which are determined solely by their race. On the other hand, life conditions are the external factors, such as climate and the nature of a slave’s master, which, like race traits, have an impact on the person’s behavior and characteristics.

In Hoffman’s text “Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro,” Hoffman attempts to explain higher rates of disease and death among “inferior” races as not a result of their particular life conditions, but rather due to their specific race traits. While discussing the increased rates of death of the Hawaiian race, Hoffman notes how, “It is not, therefore, to any unfavorable conditions of life but to a race trait, an inordinate amount of sexual immorality, that Mr. Bishop attributes the downward tendency of the race…” (Hoffman 322).  Hoffman seems to attribute increased rates of disease and death among a particular race as not a result of, for example, a new introduction of disease into the area by new comers, but rather as a result of a specific race’s natural tendency to “sexual immorality” that causes their higher rates of disease and death. In order to prove why this increased rate of disease and death is a result of natural race traits rather than life conditions, Hoffman looks at the improvement of life conditions with the introduction of European civilization into these “troubled” regions. As Hoffman notes, “With every possible chance that improved conditions of life could offer, with all the churches and schools that were needed, with willing hands ready to help, to support, to save,–this race, ‘sweet, generous and interesting,’ has in the short space of three score and ten years been reduced to less than one-fourth its original numbers” (Hoffman 323). Hoffman only specifies schools and churches when looking at the improvement of life conditions, which seems to suggest that an improvement of life conditions really means an improvement in the ability to cultivate one’s mental capacities. In a study concerned with the extinction of races, it would seem that an improvement of life conditions would include something along the lines of medical care. While Hoffman notes that there were people who where there to help and save, he does not specifically note what they where helping and saving. Were they trying to help the health of these diseased groups of people, or their morality, for example? What he also fails to do, which was undoubtedly impossible at the time of his research, was to conduct a study on the rate of disease and death before the introduction of Europeans into these areas. Maybe this would have produced a different result.

Jefferson also has a similar discussion regarding life conditions versus race traits. Jefferson provides a rather lengthy comparison between the black slaves found in American society and the white slaves found in Roman society. Whereas the acting out of the white slaves was due to the cruelty of their masters and their particular life conditions under Roman rule, the anger of black slaves in America was attributed to their race traits. After noting the harsh treatment of the white slaves under Roman rule, Jefferson notes:

Yet notwithstanding these and other discouraging circumstances among the Romans, their slaves were often their rarest artists. They excelled too in science, inasmuch as to be usually employed as tutors to their master’s children…It is not their condition then, but nature, which has produced the distinction. (Jefferson 4)

Not only does Jefferson suggest that a determinant of superiority is the ability to cultivate one’s mental talents, such as artistic and scientific ability, but he also suggests that it is the nature of a race that determines their mental ability, and thus their superiority.

What is most striking about these pieces is their tendencies to define inferiority and superiority as a result of natural race traits, rather than the external influences of life conditions. Going back to our discussion on Kant and Hegel, what are Hoffman and Jefferson really trying to prove with their distinction between race traits and life conditions? If one were to say that Native Americans, for example, were more susceptible to disease because of the introduction of Europeans and their “new” diseases into the environment, what does one gain claiming that this is a peculiarity of the Native American race, and not a life condition? Is there something to say about the claim that race traits are natural? If life conditions can change, for example, by the introduction of European churches and schools, does the claim that, in Hoffman’s case, higher rates of disease among people of color is a result of life conditions threaten the superiority of the white race? More simply stated, if these traits of races are impacted by life conditions and easily changed by a change in life conditions, is inherent inferiority in races no longer natural? Lastly, why do people such as Jefferson, Hoffman, Kant, and Hegel tend towards the idea of natural race traits and natural inferiority? Is there no white superiority, for people like Hoffman and Jefferson, if inferiority is not natural? 

References:

Jefferson, Thomas. “Equality .” Jefferson, Thomas. Notes on the State of Virginia. 1784.

Rederick, Hoffman L. Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro. New York: MacMillian Company, 1896.

 

The Survival of Immanuel Kant’s Theory on Race

Both Kant’s and Hegel’s texts were interesting to read. Both of these texts operate outside of the field of critical race theory not only because of their age, but also because they do not assume that race is a social construction. Both of these texts went to great lengths to prove the origins of certain races and why races differ.

Kant’s text entitled “Of the Different Human Races” was intriguing because he seems to suggest that racial difference can be attributed to different climates, as well as “interbreeding” between different groups or races. While Kant discusses this idea throughout the entirety of his essay, he first mentions this when he notes, “Races are deviations that are constantly preserved over many generations and come about as a consequence of migration (dislocation to other regions) or through interbreeding…” (Kant 9). Kant’s analysis of the different races also suggests, in a pseudoscientific way, that different iron levels in plants produce different colors of plants, and hence different colors of humans are a result of different iron levels in their blood. Kant notes this when he states:

We now justifiably account for different colors of plants by noting that the iron content of certain identifiably distinct plant juices varies. Similarly, since the blood of all animals contains iron, there is nothing to prevent us from accounting for the different colors of the human races by referring to exactly the same causes. (Kant 19)

It is rather strange how Kant compares plants and animals in order to account for their differences in color. Nonetheless, all of Kant’s “scientific” analysis was founded upon the assumption that there are four distinct races, namely “…(1) the white race; (2) the Negro race; (3) the Hun race (Mongol or Kalmuck); and (4) the Hindu or Hindustani race” (Kant 11).

Many would agree that Kant’s analysis of the races is outdated and false. Nonetheless, Kant’s text associates certain characteristics, such as laziness, with black people and these characteristics seem to have survived the test of time. While analyzing black people, Kant notes how, “…humid warmth generally promotes the strong growth of animals…However, because he is so amply supplied by his motherland, he is also lazy, indolent, and dawdling…” (Kant 17). According to Kant, black people live in a climate, which allows for the growth of strong animals. This idea associates black people with animals and this association is still seen today. For example, there are many cartoons that associate President Obama with monkeys.

While this image (taken from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/18/new-york-post-cartoon-race) may seem harmless upon first glance, many have found that the creators were specifically picturing President Obama as the dead ape. Hence, President Obama is associated with an animal, a convention which was clearly laid out in Kant’s “Of the Different Human Races”. Not to mention, President Obama is not the only black person who has ever been associated with monkeys. It seems that it is common to associate black people with monkeys in modern society.

Another example, initially laid out by Kant, is the laziness of black people as a whole. As noted by Paul Ryan:

This association of black people with laziness is common in modern-day society, and is often seen by the connection between black people and welfare. Interestingly enough, evidence seems to suggest that black people are not the largest recipients of welfare, rather poor white people are the largest recipients. For example, a Huffington Post article has found that the majority of people receiving food stamps are actually white, not black (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/28/food-stamp-demographics_n_6771938.html).

Thus, my question is this: how has Kant’s theory survived the test of time? More simply stated, how has Kant’s analysis of black people, namely that they are animalistic and lazy, persisted until today? After reading his theory, it is clear that it is based upon pseudoscientific findings. Nonetheless, society is still unable to break away from these pervasive ideas about black people. Assuming that race is a social construct, how can these aspects of Kant’s theory still be employed today? If race is a social construct, and some in society still believe that black people are animalistic and lazy, could this suggest that what Kant’s theory is really getting at is how race is socially constructed, rather than a scientific principle? Did Kant’s analysis, in this sense, cave in on itself?

References:

Kant, Immanuel. “Of the Different Human Races.” Bernasconi, Robert and Tommy L. Lott. The Idea of Race. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2000. 8-22.

Tyrannies of Silence (Response to Lorde)

Lorde’s piece entitled “The Transformation of Silence into Language and Action,” seems highly concerned with the idea of language. What is most striking about Lorde’s piece is the idea of “tyrannies of silence” (Lorde 41). Lorde first uses this term when she notes, “The women who sustained me through that period were Black and white, old and young, lesbian, bisexual, and heterosexual, and we all shared a war against the tyrannies of silence” (Lorde 41). Not only does Lorde bring up the idea of coalitions, or groups of people with different intersectionalities working towards a goal, but she also associates her past instances of silence with tyranny. In the most basic sense, tyranny is a form of rule, or a regime, that is greatly repressive to the people who are subject to the tyrannical system of rule. In this sense, Lorde seems to suggest that there is a regime of power that is attempting to repress those who have been historically “othered,” using the mechanism of silence. If tyranny, in this case, is assumed to be a regime, one must ask: what the regime entails?; who controls this regime?; and does the regime silence everyone in the same ways?

Lorde, while not directly, provides some clues as to who the perpetrator of the “tyrannies of silence” (Lorde 41) may be. Lorde notes how, “…the machine will try to grind you into dust anyway, whether or not we speak” (Lorde 42). Again, one must wonder, who or what Lorde means by machine? Is there something special about the mechanical nature of a machine? When Lorde references the tyranny of silence and the mechanized nature of oppression through silence, she seems to mean that the system of white supremacy is to blame. Before referencing the mechanized nature of oppression, Lorde suggests, “For to survive in the mouth of this dragon we call america, we have had to learn this first and most vital lesson – that we were never meant to survive” (Lorde 42). Not only does Lorde mention survival rather than, for example, thriving, but she also suggests that America was mechanically and systematically set up with the intended goal that only certain people, namely white males, would thrive at the expense of others. This is done, currently, through the mechanisms of “fear of contempt, of censure, or some judgment, or recognition, of challenge, of annihilation” (Lorde 42) and silence.

It is also important to note that Lorde uses the term tyrannies, rather than tyranny. Lorde seems to suggest that there are multiple systems of power, operating simultaneously, and having a tyrannical and oppressive impact on those who have been historically repressed and silenced. While some may have not read the work of Foucault, it is important to evoke his idea of power. In Foucault’s text The History of Sexuality: Volume 1: An Introduction, power is described as an omnipresent force. Specifically, Foucault notes how, “Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere…power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society” (Foucault 93). For Foucault, power is everywhere because it is produced by more than juridical laws. Power is created through relations and actions during everyday life; power is not just law enacted by the government. Hence, while Lorde may be suggesting that the tyrannical system of power in play is the U.S. government, she may also be pointing to the fact that power, or the tyrannies of silence, cannot simply be highlighted by looking at the government. Rather, one must also look at non-governmental individuals to be able to determine who is suppressing them. In addition, this understanding of power will further be able to show the complex ways in which the system of white supremacy operates.

The first question I want to pose is: do you think this is a correct interpretation of Lorde’s argument? Is the tyranny of silence put in place to thwart the survival of people of color, women, homosexuals, among other groups of people, all for the benefit of the white supremacist America? If America is employing a violent and tyrannical regime of white supremacy, does this mean that, in order to topple the system of white supremacy, one must also topple the American system in its entirety? Can we separate America from white supremacy? If, as Mills notes, “[w]hite supremacy is the unnamed political system” (Mills 1), is America’s system frontally concerned with perpetuating and maintaining the system of white supremacy? Is the killing of unarmed black people, for example, a political action of America’s tyrannical regime of white supremacy? Further, does Lorde’s use of the word tyrannies over tyranny suggest that there are multiple perpetrators of white supremacy outside of the government? Do individuals uphold the tyrannical rule of white supremacy? Lorde’s piece poses some interesting issues for the future of America, as well as the entire western world.

–M.O.

References:

Foucault, Michael. The History of Sexuality: Volume 1: An Introduction. Trans. Robert    Hurley. New York: Vintage Books, 1990.

Lorde, Audre. “The Transformation of Silence into Language and Action.” Lorde, Audre. Zami, Sister Outsider, Undersong. New York: Quality Paperback Book     Club, 1993. 40-44.

Mills, Charles M. The Racial Contract. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.